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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RITA C. GUM,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
*

Priority No. 16

*
*

VS.

JAMES RICHARD GUM,

Case No. 920164-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

*

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is conferred by virtue of Section
78-2a-3 (2) (g), Utah Code Annotated.

1953. as amended. Court of

Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1988].
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented by this appeal:
1.

Is the Amended Decree of Divorce illegal, since legal procedures

required by the Utah Code were not followed by the trial court, and should
it be declared null and void and accordingly be remanded for proper
reconsideration of those issues set forth in the original Order of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
2.

Who legally owns the house at 5685 South 3650 West, Bennion,

Utah, which the parties bought and rented to Jim Gum, James son, who
still rents it and resides there, as it is held on a deed as joint tenants by
the parties.

3.

Did the conduct of the trial court in ignoring the Utah Code, as

shown in the transcript, constitute additional judicial bias and
misconduct; and should the judge be replaced by the Utah Court of Appeals
on remand of the case; so that it may be properly concluded.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial courts have considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and
property interest of parties in a divorce, and the decision of the trial
court is presumed valid. Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App.
1987).

This presumption is overcome where the appellant shows that the

trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or that the evidence clearly preponderated against
the findings; or that such a serious inequity occurred so as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion. M-

In determining whether an error has been

made by the trial court, the appellate court may review both the facts and
the law, Woodward v. Woodward. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutes relied upon by the Plaintiff are:

Statutes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated.. (1984), as amended.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-7, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-3-10.6, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-6-2, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 30-6-4, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 62A-4-502, Utah Code Annotated. 1953, as amended.
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (g), Utah Code Annotated. 1953. as amended.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1988].
2

United
13.

States

Constitution

Section 1, 14th Amendment.
Rules

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
201 (d), (f), Utah Rules of Evidence.
701. Utah Rules of Evidence.
702, Utah Rules of Evidence.
901, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Cases
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
Gramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978).
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 436 (Utah 1986).
Saint v. Saint. 411 P.2d 683, 196 Kan. 330 (Kan. 1966).
Gardner v. Gardner. 512 P.2d 84, 85 N.M. 324 (N.M. 1973).
Fife v. Fife. 479 P.2d 560, 3 Wash.App.726 (Wash.App.1970).
McCov v. McCov. 429 P.2d 999 (Okl. 1967).
Countryman v. Countryman. 659 P.2d 663, 135 Ariz. 110.
Christopher v. Christopher. 381 P.2d 115, 62 Wash.2d 82.
(Wash. 1963)
Brammer v. Brammer. 471 P.2d 58, 93 Idaho (Idaho 1970).
Hofer v. Hofer. 427 P.2d 411, 247 Or. 82 (Or. 1967).
Barrett v. Barrett. 403 P.2d 649, 17 Utah 2d1 (Utah 1965).
Laws v. Laws. 432 P.2d 632, 164 Colo. 80 (Colo. 1967).
Montague v. Montague. 510 P.2d 901 (Colo.App. 1973).
Foutch v.Foutch. 469 P.2d 2333, 2 Wash. App. 407.
(Wash.App 1970)
Kelso v. Kelso. 448 P.2d 499, 75 Wash.2d, 24 (Wash. 1968).
Wick v. Wick. 489 P.2d 19, 107 Ariz.382 (Ariz. 1971).
Hum v. Hum. 541 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1975).
Matter of Marriage of Clapperton 649 P.2d 620, 58 Or.App. 577
(Or.App. 1982).
Wanberg v. Wanberg. 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983).
Christiansen v. Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592 (Utah 1983).
Nesmith v. Nesmith. 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975).
In re Marriage of Manzo. 659 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1983).
Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988).
Ruhsam v. Ruhsam. 742 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1987).
Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
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45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Fischer v. Fischer. 443 P.2d 463, 92 Idaho 379 (Idaho 1968).
Hansen v..Hansen. 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975).
Carter v. Carter. 379 P.2d 311, 191 Kan.
Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980).
Dehm v. Dehm. 5545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976)
Olson v. Olson. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985)
Newmever v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987).
Jones v. Jones.. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1985).
Canning v. Canning. 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987).
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).

56.

Rasband v, Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)

57.
58.
59.
60.

English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987).
Bushell v. Bushel!. 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982).
Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948).

61.

Heltman v. Heltman. 511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The record in this case is voluminous due in large part to the fact

that the plaintiff did not have funds to move from her home on H Street.
Substantial portions of the record deal with this issue and no provisions
of funds were made to help her move.
2. At the conclusion of what appears to be a very unorthodox and
disjointed trial proceeding, the trial court allowed the defendant's
attorney. Glen M. Richman, to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, as Attorneys for Plaintiff which alone should make the divorce
invalid. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was handed to the
plaintiff in court, September 6, 1990, the day of the trial with no
opportunity before-hand to read it.
3. On October 4, 1990, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. No CrossAppeal was filed.
4. The divorce case was first appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals
from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court entered
4

on September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-CA. Before Judges Orme,
Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing).
5. The Court remanded the case for reconsideration, stating:
"However, the record contains insufficient evidence to
support the court's finding #17 regarding costs and fees and
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briggs v.
Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v.
Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those issues.
If, having decided those issues, the court determines some
adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution is in
order, the court has the discretion to make such adjustments."
6. The case was remanded to the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Honorable John A.
Rokich, Judge presiding.
Rita C. Gum, as Plaintiff, filed an Affidavit of Prejudice, stating:
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, and I cannot
have a fair and impartial trial before the Honorable John A.
Rokich, Judge of the Third District Court, before whom this
action is now pending, for the reason that the Honorable John
A. Rokich is biased and prejudiced against this affiant, as
hereinafter more particularly alleged.
7. The record shows that this matter was not handled by the court as
required in accordance with the Utah Code.
8. The trial court forced the plaintiff to attend court, October 17,
1991, under threat of contempt in regards to child custody of Amy
Charmaine Gum. Then changed the purpose of the hearing "to schedule an
evidentiary hearing to get this matter resolved."
9.

(Tr. 1).

The court preceded to improperly set a hearing which the court had

no right, in law, to set and then proceeded with the hearing without the
plaintiff present.

The plaintiff did not appear at the November 1, 1991
5

hearing as the matter of Judge Michael R. Murphy's ruling on the prejudice
charge was not completed.

(Tr. 24).

The law clearly states that the judge

can not proceed until this procedure is completed. Judge Murphy's Order is
dated December 3, 1991. The hearing was plainly illegal as it was held
before the order was issued.
10.

The transcript again shows the prejudice of the Honorable John A.

Rokich who ignored issues of the remand of The Utah Court of Appeals.
11.

Glen M. Richman, the Attorney for the defendant prepared

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of
Divorce which ignored issues of the remand of The
12.

Utah Court o1 Appeals.

This second appeal is from this final Amended Decree of Divorce

of the District Court of the Third Judicial District entered on/or about
February 14, 1992.

The Decree is clearly illegal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marital

History

The parties were married on March 24, 1982 , in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah (p. 2, par. 2 - Record on Appeal).
Rita was 46 years of age and James was 52 when they were married.
During the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired
investments which should be equitably divided (p. 3, par. 8 - Record on
Appeal).
Rita is the mother of two minor children who were adopted by
defendant and are considered to be issue of the marital relationship, to
wit: Amy Charmaine Gum (DOB 3/14/75) and Joy Charmaine Gum
9/22/76)

(DOB

(p.2, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).

On March 8, 1990, Rita filed a Complaint for divorce
on Appeal).
6

(pp. 2-4,- Record

Defendant moved out of the parties' place of residence (p. 7, par. 2 Record on Appeal).
Defendant

failed to provide for any expenses for plaintiff such that the

house payment and all utilities will remain unpaid, if they are not paid by
defendant (p. 7, par. 3.- Record on Appeal).
Defendant took plaintiff's name off all bank accounts and has withheld
all marital assets and money from plaintiff except her part-time
employment at the Hilton Hotel from which she earns $300 to $400 per
month (p. 7, par. 4 - Record on Appeal).
Plaintiff needed the home and furnishings to care for the children and
$540.00 per month as temporary child support (p. 7, par. 5 - Record on
Appeal).
Rita is a fit and proper parent who should be awarded the care, custody
and control of the minor children subject to defendant's reasonable
visitation (p. 3, par. 5 - Record on Appeal).
Defendant should maintain all health, accident and life insurance
policies preserving the currently named beneficiaries until the youngest
child reaches age 18. (p. 3, par. 13 - Record on Appeal).
Rita is entitled to retirement income from defendant's employment
when she is age 60, said retirement should be ordered by the Court (p. 3,
par. 9 - Record on Appeal).
On March 26, 1990, James filed an Answer and Counterclaim (pp. 12 27 - Record on Appeal).
ERA - Carlson & Company, Realtors, letter dated April 5, 1990:
Rita Gum has been most cooperative in trying to get her
home sold. She has provided a key for the front door, which is

7

in a Realtors' key box. This makes the house accessible to all
Realtors at any time.
Rita has kept the property in a show-able condition and
agreed to a price reduction in order to try to get the home sold
(p. 188 - Record on Appeal).
In May 1990 Rita received a copy of Order on Order to Show Cause
and Objections to Commissioner's Recommendation. ORDERS as follows:
The plaintiff shall vacate the parties home on or before the
20th day of May, 1990 and the defendant shall take possession
thereof (p. 62, par. 2 - Record on Appeal).
This order should clearly be a violation of Rita's and the minor
children's rights under the 14th Amendment of Section 1 of the United
States Constitution as quoted (p. 44, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).
The home was jointly owned by Rita and James as well as the one at
5685 South 3650 West, Bennion, Utah, (A-2), which they bought and rented
to Jim Gum, James son.
Commissioner Peuler was also influenced by the fact that defendant
was living in his son's home (the son was not there). He v/as not making
any rental or mortgage payments on the home and was thus enjoying free
housing (p. 51, par. 8 - Record on Appeal).
The rental agreement was and still is making the mortgage payments
and James is still living there.
Commissioner Peuler stated that it would be in the best interests of
the children for plaintiff and the children to stay in the home until the
home is sold (p. 50, par. 5 - Record on Appeal).
The Court's ruling that plaintiff move out of the home in Twenty days is
not reasonable due to the fact that the children are in school until June 8

8

and such a move would disrupt the children's school and social activities
(p. 51, par. 9 - Record on Appeal).
On the 25th day of May, 1990 Rita was deposed and during said
deposition she put her physical and medical condition into issue. She
made a claim for alimony in her Complaint (p. 98, par. 2 - Record on
Appeal).
Mr. Welker was sent a copy of the deposition notices and a letter dated
May 30, 1990 which in part says:
It appears it will be necessary to take the depositions of Dr.
Keith and Dr. Maddock. (p. 99, par. 4 - Record on Appeal).
Rita received a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel dated 31 day of May,
1990 -— on the grounds that he is permanently moving to California

(p.

79,- Record on Appeal).
Earl S. Spafford and L. Charles Spafford of the firm of Spafford and
Spafford enter their appearance as her counsel June 12, 1990

(p. 81,-

Record on Appeal).
There after it appears that Mr. Spafford entered an appearance signed
the 12th day of June, presented an Ex Parte Motion to a judge not assigned
to the case for a protective order, and received an Ex Parte Protective
Order and Stay without any notification to plaintiff's counsel,
(p. 100, par. 6 - Record on Appeal).
Dr. Robert K. Maddock Jr., M.D. was served Subpoena Duces Tecum on 13
June 90 (p. 120 - Record on Appeal).
Dr. Thomas B. Keith, M.D. was not available for service (p. 117,- Record
on Appeal).
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Rita through her attorney Earl S. Spafford requests of the court oral
argument on her Motion for Stay of Proceedings and for Rehearing, June
18, 1990 (p. 145,- Record on Appeal).
Despite the Order requiring the plaintiff to move from the home by
the 20th day of May, she has refused to do so and is in disobedience of the
Court Order, and remains in said home (p. 99, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).
Defendant moves the Court for an Order to Show Cause requiring the
plaintiff to show cause, if any she has, why she should not be required to
immediately vacate the parties' home as required by earlier Court Order,
and upon her failure to do so, why she should not be held in contempt and
punished accordingly (p. 102, par. 13 - Record on Appeal).
Defendant desires to have the medical records for the claimed
treatment of plaintiff which she has put in issue, unless plaintiff forever
waives any claim to alimony (p. 102, par. 11 - Record on Appeal).
Defendant, James R. Gum, purchased a home in 1970 with his first wife
who is now deceased.

The majority of dispute in this action appears to

revolve around the house which was clearly premarital property of the
defendant (p. 122, par. 1 - Record on Appeal).
But, this house became jointly owned by the two parties when they took
a new mortgage on it making Rita also responsible for the payments.
Defendant has agreed that any money additions accrued to his
retirement during the marriage of the parties should be divided equally
between the parties (p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal).
Plaintiff is impecunious.

She has no resources with which to pay the

costs of moving and no present ability to provide substitute housing for
the minor children of the parties.

Plaintiff is 54 years of age and in

fragile health, (p. 148, par. 6 - Record on Appeal).
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Plaintiff made diligent inquiry in an effort to find adequate housing for
herself and daughters without success.

In this regard she has inquired as

to public shelters and was informed that housing is available only for a
short term basis (p. 148, par. 7 - Record on Appeal).
To move said minor children into a shelter environment would impact
upon their schooling, their church activity, their social relationship and
their welfare, and would not be in their best interest

(p. 148, par. 6 - 8 -

Record on Appeal) (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff, Rita C. Gum, is to vacate the home of the parties where she
has been residing, located at 655 H Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, within ten
(10) days from the 11th day of July, 1990; that on or before the 21st day
of July, 1990 (p. 167, par. 1 - Record on Appeal).
Immediately after the date the plaintiff vacates the home, the
defendant may occupy the home for a period of thirty (30) days for the
purpose of getting the home ready for sale. The defendant must vacate the
home within thirty (30) days from his occupancy and the home must be
sold within thirty (30) days thereafter

(p. 168, par. 2 - Record on Appeal).

The depositions of Dr. Keith and Dr. Maddock may be taken, and the
records obtained (p. 168, par. 3 - Record on Appeal).
The difference in the refund from the two returns, that is the savings
or additional refund received by filing joint return, is to be paid over to
the plaintiff

(p. 168, par. 4 - Record on Appeal).

The court, having received Motion for an Order to withdraw, good cause
appearing therefore, it is hereby ORDERED:
Earl S, Spafford of the firm of SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, a
Professional Corporation, attorneys for the Plaintiff, Rita
Gum, are to withdraw as attorney of record in the above

11

entitled matter. Dated this 30 day of July, 1990
Record on Appeal).

(p. 165 -

Rita sold the house herself at a "give away price" of One Hundred and
Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000).

She had two appraisals of over

Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000).
Rita filed a Supplement to Complaint and Partial Response to
Defendant's Counter Offer, of July 25, 1990:
My attorneys have withdrawn, and I am so depleted
financially that I am unable to incur further attorney's
expenses, and therefore choose to represent myself and file
this for myself (p. 173 - Record on Appeal.
She was also exhausted and depleted emotionally.
do almost anything to get the divorce over with.

She was willing to

She was willing to let

James be awarded the divorce. Let him have custody of the children
they choose. She had sold the family home herself
the court decide how to divide the money.

or gave it away; let

She was agreeable in letting

the court determine the amount of child support.

She only requested "that

the court, after full examination and consideration, resolve them as his
sense of equity and justice dictate."
What did the court's sense of equity and justice dictate?
Rita was handed the Trial Brief, in court by Glen M. Richman, the
Defendant's Attorney, with no chance to read it beforehand.
It is headed:
Glen M. Richman, (2757)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
RITA B. GUM
Plaintiff,

12

if

Can Mr. Richman represent both parties legally in Utah?
conflict of interest?

Maybe not.

Isn't this a

But isn't it like having the fox guard the

hen-house (p. 178 - Record on Appeal)?
The Decree for Divorce was headed the same way, the first paragraph
read:
1.
Defendant is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce upon
the grounds of irreconcilable differences, to be final upon
entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on Appeal).
This clause could be expected from the Attorney for the Defendant.
The Trial Brief, which is headed, Attorneys for Plaintiff, is signed by
GLEN M. RICHMAN, Attorney for Defendant (p. 182 - Record on Appeal)
[Emphasis added]
Judge John A. Rokich changed this paragraph (handwritten) to read:
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby awarded a mutual
Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable
differences, to be final upon entry (p. 201, par. 1. - Record on
Appeal).
On October 4, 1990, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. No CrossAppeal was filed.
The divorce case was first appealed to The Utah Court of Appeals from
a final Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court entered on
September 10, 1990. Case No. 900528-CA. Before Judges Orme,
Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing).
The Court remanded the case for reconsideration. The case was
remanded to the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge
presiding.

13

A final Amended Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District Court
entered on/or about February 14, 1992.
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
on March 12, 1992 and was transferred to The Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This second appeal is from a final Amended Decree of Divorce of the
Third Judicial District Court entered on/or about February 14, 1992.
No Cross-Appeal has been filed.
The case was first appealed from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third
Judicial District Court entered on September 10, 1990.

Case No. 900528-

CA. Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing). It was
remanded for reconsideration of certain issues which were not
reconsidered by the trial court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
Is the Amended Decree of Divorce illegal, since legal
procedures required by the Utah Code were not followed by the
trial court, and should it be declared null and void and
accordingly be remanded for proper reconsideration of those
issues set forth in the original Order of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

(A-1),

POINT II:
Who legally owns the house at 5685 South 3650 West,
Bennion, Utah, which the parties bought and rented to Jim Gum,
James son, who still rents it and resides there, as it is held on

14

a deed as joint tenants by James Richard Gum and Rita C. Gum.
(A-2).
POINT III:
Did the conduct of the trial court in ignoring the Utah Code,
as shown in the transcript, constitute added judicial bias and
misconduct; and should the judge be replaced by the Utah Court
of Appeals on remand of the case; so that it may be properly
concluded.

(Entire transcript).
ARGUMENTS

POINT I:
Is the Amended Decree of Divorce illegal, since legal
procedures required by the Utah Code were not followed by the
trial court, and should it be declared null and void and
accordingly be remanded for proper reconsideration of those
issues set forth in the original Order of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

(A-1).

Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the
matter of disqualification of a judge:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that
the judge before whom such action or proceedings is to be
tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the judge
against whom the affidavit is directed questions the
sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing
that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like
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jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge against whom the
affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified
finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called
in. to try the case or determine the matter in question,"
Emphasis added.
There was not a hearing held of the Appellant before the Honorable
Judge Michael R. Murphy ("except to call in another judge to hear and
determine the matter "). Judge Murphey's Order, dated December 3, 1991,
states"
It is therefore ordered that the matter is referred back to the
assigned judge for resolution. (A- 3).
This Order came to late in the case.

The Honorable John A. Rokich had

denied removal of the cause to another judge until after the hearings of
October 17, 1991 and November 1, 1991. Therefor any order or judgment
based on evidence taken by the judge at these hearings is ineffective
against the Appellant.
Effect of Affidavit.

If after a party files an affidavit of bias or

prejudice, a judge denies removal of the cause to another judge, as
contemplated by Subdivision (b), any order or judgment based on evidence
thereafter taken by the judge is ineffective against the affiant.

Anderson

v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962).
This cause came before the Honorable John A. Rokich for a second trial
after remand by the Utah Court of Appeals for reconsideration of issues on
an appeal by the Appellant taken from a Decree of Divorce from the abovenamed Appellee.

It is the rule in at least one jurisdiction that the original

trial judge is disqualified to sit on retrial after a mistrial or reversal
when the circumstances and conditions surrounding the litigation are of
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such nature that they might cast doubt and question as to the fairness or
impartially of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, even though he
is not conscious of any bias or prejudice.
In Re Estate of Hupp (1955) 178 Kan 672, 291 P2d 428, the petition for
disqualification was denied by the trial judge, the case again proceeded to
trial, and the court again made findings of fact and conclusions of law
substantially similar to its findings on the first trial.

On appeal, the

action of the trial judge in refusing to disqualify himself was specified as
error.
The court stated that the basic principal upon which the
disqualification statute rested is the purpose of the law that no judge
shall hear and determine a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial, and independent.

The corollary of this rule, held

the court, is that when circumstances and conditions surrounding
litigation are of such nature that they might cast doubt and question as to
the fairness or impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may
pronounce, such judge, even though he is not conscious of any bias or
prejudice, should disqualify himself and permit the case to be tried before
a judge pro tern.

Remarking that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to

maintain and safeguard the right of trial by a fair and impartial tribunal,
and to be vigilant in seeing to it that every possible semblance of
reasonable doubt or suspicion on that question is removed and eliminated
to the end that justice may be properly administered, and the court
concluded that under the composite or collective impression gained by
careful consideration of the situation as it existed at the time of the
judge's overruling of the petition for disqualification, it would have been
better for all parties concerned, and conducive to the best interests of the
17

judiciary in general, if the trial judge had sustained the petition for
disqualification, and held that it was error for him to have refused to do
so.
POINT II:
Who legally owns the house at 5685 South 3650 West,
Bennion, Utah, which the parties bought and rented to Jim Gum,
James son, who still rents it and resides there, as it is held on
a deed as joint tenants by James Richard Gum and Rita C. Gum.
(A-2).
James testified at the first trial as follows:
Q (By Mr. Richman) Mr. Gum, when you were married to your first wife
did you purchase a home?
A. Yes, I did.
Q Where is that home?
A. 635 H Street here in Salt Lake City.
Q And whose money did you use to purchase that home?
A. My money.
Q And is that where the plaintiff is residing at the time?
A.

Yes.

Q Was the house remodeled after you married this present wife, Rita
Gum?
A. Yes, it was.
Q And whose money was used to remodel the house?
A. My money.
Q Was it from your earnings at work?
A. Earnings, my earnings.
Q And savings?
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A. And savings.
Q And was there any money at the time provided to you by Rita Gum,
the plaintiff in this action, to remodel or purchase anything toward the
upkeep of this house?
A. None whatsoever. (Tr. p. 3, line 24 - 25; p. 4, line 1 - 24).
There were three mortgages, taken in the names of the parties for
funds to do the remodeling, causing the property to be held jointly.
Proffer by Mr, Spafford as follows:
Mr. Spafford: Let me make a proffer, your honor, to save a lot of
time.
My proffer is that she earns less than $600 a month; he earns $3,000
month. This couple has two homes. The one is the exhibit 9-P, which is
the home they're living in. It is owned jointly by them, and while
admittedly it was acquired prior to the marriage, during the marriage
from marital assets the home was remodeled. Indeed it was conveyed to
her jointly with him, so she's has an equitable interest in the property.
They have a second piece of property in Salt Lake County, the lot 72,
Whitewood Estates, another home which is also deeded to the two parties
jointly, Mr. Gum has placed, under a rental agreement, his son in the
second piece property, and he is collecting the rent on it, (A-2).
So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the home she's living
in and effectively grants him the possession of both pieces of property,
two homes [Emphasis added]
So we have the ludicrous situation of a woman who earns a poverty
level wage, who has no place to go. and who has a equity in two separate
pieces of property: and the husband winds up with both pieces of property
while she's effectively put out on the street (Tr. p. 20, 21 -25; p. 21).
[Emphasis added]
In re Marriage of Kittleson 585 P.2d 167, 21 Wash.App. 344
(Wash.App. 1978). the court stated:
In marriage dissolution action, it is trial court's duty to
characterize property of parties as community or separate, and
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to dispose of all property of parties which is brought to its
attention.
In another Washington case Lvnn v. Lynn 480 P.2d 789, 4 Wash.App.
171 (Wash.App. 1971) the court stated:
Although trial court is not in a divorce proceeding required
to award all separate property to the party acquiring it or to
divide community property equally, the court does not have
unfetted freedom to exercise its personal judgment. RCWA
26.08-110.
Disposition of property is cited in Section 30-3-5,

Utah Code

Annotated. 1953, as amended.
In a Wyoming case Kane v. Kane 577 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1978) the court
stated:
In a divorce proceeding the disposition of property of the
parties is an equitable function of the court.
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy.

In the Arizona

case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 (Ariz. 1975).

it

is stated:
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial court
in divorce. A.R.S. § 25-318.
In making a division of marital property in a divorce proceeding, the
trial Court is governed by general principles of equity.

Title 30 Chapter 3,

Section 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Land v. Land. 605 P.2d
1248.
This writer submits that there is no semblance of equity in awarding of
the other home to the Respondent with no part of that asset to the
Appellant.
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This matter was not settled in the second trial and entered in the
Amended Decree of Divorce.

Nor was the matter of other mutually owned

assets addressed.

POINT III:
Did the conduct of the trial court in ignoring the Utah Code,
as shown in the transcript, constitute added judicial bias and
misconduct; and should the judge be replaced by the Utah Court
of Appeals on remand of the case; so that it may be properly
concluded.

(Entire

transcript).

The transcript of the first trial begins:
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.)
The Court: Do vou think we are going to finish this bv five o'clock?
(Tr.. p. 1, lines 20 - 21). [Emphasis added].
Mr. Richman: Oh, sure.
Q (By Mr. Spafford)
you moved out?
A.

Let me put it this way. Where would you go if

I don't have anyplace to go.
The Court: That's immaterial.

[Emphasis added].
[Emphasis added].

Mr. Spafford: It goes to the issue of contempt, your Honor.
The court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not where she's
going to go. [Emphasis added].
Q (By Mr. Spafford)

Why haven't you moved out?

A. I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have anv money to ao anyplace.
(Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13). [Emphasis added].
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can sort it out.
I told vou in the first instance I'm inclined to have her move out of the
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house: They haven't shown me any reason why she shouldn't be out. So, I'm
not convinced that the fact that she hasn't anv place to go is anv reason
that I should not enforce the order. So, you know- (Tr. p. 25, lines 16 22). [Emphasis added].
Had the court not decided the issue before hearing the testimony, and
was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony?

Can a court make

an unbiased and unprejudiced decision without weighing the testimony of
moving a person out of their home against their rights under the 14th
Amendment of Section 1 of the United States Constitution?
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v.
Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint
of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have
the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
courts.' Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this
point when he wrote: 'One of the most important things in
government is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall
always be able to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all
matters of litigation in the courts. It is nearly as important
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity of the
courts. I can think of nothing that would as surely bring the
courts into disrepute as for a judge to insist on trying a case
when one of the litigants believes that such judge is biased
and prejudiced against him'." Marchant v. Marchant 743 P.2d
199 (Utah App. 1987)x
The same pattern of contempt was followed in the second trial as is
shown by the transcript.
It is respectfully urged that the foregoing conduct constitutes judicial
bias and an error in law and should not be condoned by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in awarding the Decree of Divorce. The Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Amended Decree of
Divorce, should be declared null and void.
That the case should be remanded to the trial court before a new judge;
with a similar Order to the previous one, only more clearly setting out the
ruling of the

Court of Appeals

The Appellant should have the opportunity to be awarded a fair and
equitable division of all marital property in a new trial with a fair judge
who will abide the law.
Attorney's fees should be considered by the trial court.

Considering the

ability of Appellant to pay those fees and the cost of two appeals.

Rita's

disposable income is far less than James' as well as being less stable.
In addition, she should have the opportunity to be awarded her interest
in all mutual property, including the house in Bennion, and the Appellee's
retirement program.
Appellant respectfully requests that the relief requested be granted.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of November, 1992.

RitaC. Gum
Attorney Pro Se for the Appellant
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RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

^Mary T. NooriMn
Clerk of th« Court
Utah Court of Appeals

ooOoo
Rita C. Gum,
ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
James Richard Gum,

Case No. 900528-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Russon (Rule 31 Hearing).
Based on the evidence in the record and, in particular,
plaintiff's concessions as set forth in the document she filed
with the court styled by her a supplemental complaint, we
affirm the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding
alimony, child support, the grounds for granting the divorce,
and the real property and sale proceeds.
However, the record contains insufficient evidence to
support the court's finding #17 regarding costs and fees and
the court's finding regarding defendant's pension. See Briqqs
v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Birch v.
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we remand for reconsideration of those issues.
If, having decided those issues, the court determines some
adjustment to other aspects of the property distribution is in
order, the court has the discretion to make such adjustments.
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1991.
ALL CONCUR:

Gregor^K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

RITA C. GUM,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

904901065

vs.
JAMES RICHARD GUM,
Defendant.

This matter

was referred

63(b), Utah Rules of
The

latter

affidavit of

has

specifically notes
specific pages of a

assigned judge under Rule

Civil Procedure,

reviewed

bias

by the

and
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file,

prejudice

that neither
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and

determines

legally

a transcript

transcript were

presiding judge.
that the

insufficient and
nor references to

provided in

support of the

affidavit•
It is

therefore ordered that the matter is referred back to

the assigned judge for resolution.
Dated this

^

day of December, 1991.
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PRESIDING JUDGE

s\

GUM V. GUM

ORDER

PAGE TWO

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed
the

foregoing

Order,

to

the

a true

and correct

following,

this

December, 1991:

Rita C. Gum
Pro se
1034 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105

Glen M. Richman
Attorney for Defendant
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

C

^i/cr&

AA-AJ£=Z

j

copy of
day of

